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Éva Kuti*
e Consistency of Charitable Behaviour and Its 
Fund Raising Implications
This paper tries to take an initial step toward a deeper understanding of the differences and similarities 
between corporate, individual and 1% philanthropy. Though both corporate and individual giving have 
a huge international literature (e.g. Adam 2004; Archambault & Boumendi 1998; Burlingame 1997, 2001; 
Halfpenny 1999; Schervish & Haven, 1997; Wang & Graddy 2008; Zamagni,1995) and 1% philanthropy is 
also discussed by several, mainly Eastern European authors (e.g. Bódi 2001; Chano 2008; Gerencsér & Oprics 
2007; Török & Moss 2004; Vajda & Kuti 2002), the connections between these different kinds of philanthropic 
activities have not yet been scrutinized. Correspondingly, very little attention has been paid to the issues 
of how third sector organizations could develop an efficient ‘fund raising mix’; how they should combine 
their efforts to solicit contributions from different kinds of donors. In order to answer these questions, the 
author takes an interdisciplinary approach; she uses several different types of analytical and statistical 
methods. The statistical analysis of the donors’ motivation is based on the results of three empirical surveys1
of individual giving, 1% philanthropy and corporate donations which were carried out in Hungary over the 
last couple of years. The third sector organizations’ fund raising behaviour is analyzed using both official 
statistical data (KSH 1998–2008) and information gathered through interviews (Laki & Szalai 2004; T. Pus-
kás 2006) and case studies (Kotler & Lee 2007; Török 2005b).
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1% Philanthropy and Traditional Forms of Giving
While both individual and corporate giving have a long tradition, the system of 1% 
designations (at least as a special form of state support to civil society organizations) is 
completely new. It was established in Hungary in 19972 (Bódi 2007). e essence of the 
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The first version of this paper was presented at the 8th International Conference of the International Society for Third 
Sector Research in Barcelona, July 9-12, 2008.
1 All three were representative sample surveys. The percentage philanthropy survey (1839 in-home personal interviews) 
was carried out in 1999 (Vajda & Kuti, 2000). Owners and managers responsible for the corporate giving decisions of 
1405 firms were interviewed in 2003 (Kuti, 2005). The individual giving and volunteering survey (5000 in-home personal 
interviews) was carried out in 2004 (Czike & Kuti, 2005).
2 Since then, this technique of the indirect public support has become a model: similar supporting schemes have been 
developed in Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia (Török, 2005a), and in a municipality in Japan (Chano, 2008).
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new funding scheme is that the government cedes some part of its redistribution power 
to taxpayers. ey are authorized to choose the civil society organizations to which one 
percent of their personal income tax payments has to be transferred by the tax authority. 
When taxpayers designate a recipient organization, they do not make any personal sacrice, 
they decide on the use of pure public money.
However, the actual decision makers are the very same people who are also asked 
for individual gis (and eventually, in their capacity as entrepreneurs or top managers, for 
corporate donations). is is why some worries emerged in the debates surrounding the 
introduction of the 1% system. e central issue of these debates – certainly unresolvable 
at the time – was the impact of the 1% contributions on the level of private giving. 
Several experts feared that taxpayers would interpret their 1% designation as a sucient 
philanthropic act, thus they would decline other kinds of solicitations and, consequently, 
nonprot organizations would become less able to attract private donations. ose in 
the optimistic camp predicted that exactly the opposite would happen. ey hoped that 
taxpayers, already persuaded to exercise the new form of costless ‘percentage philanthropy’, 
would also gradually be persuaded to give money from their own pockets.
Data collected by the Statistical Oce for the period 1996–2006 (Figure 1) suggest 
that the 1% system has not overshadowed private donations, or reduced their importance.
Figure 1
Growth of 1% designations, individual and corporate donations in Hungary, 
1996–2006
Sources: (KSH 1998–2008)
Both individual and corporate donations have signicantly increased since the introduction 
of the 1% system. Its emergence is a net gain to the voluntary sector; the 1% provision has not 
produced a ‘crowding out’ eect. 
e delegation of distribution decisions to taxpayers has widened the availability 
of public funds. Even the small nonprot organizations unable to nd their way in the 
labyrinth of state redistribution have their chance of persuading taxpayers to select them 
as the recipient of their 1% contribution. e 1% support, then, is available for a large 
number of voluntary organizations which are not familiar with the rules, procedures and 
actors of the state redistribution process. In fact, the 1% scheme more than doubled the 
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number of nonprot organizations supported from the central budget in the year of its 
introduction (Vajda & Kuti 2000) and this number has continuously increased since then 
(KSH 1998–2008).
More than half of Hungarian NPOs have access to the 1% support and/or donations 
(Figure 2). However, the share of organizations receiving all three kinds of contributions 
is strikingly low, less than one tenth of the voluntary sector. Almost one third of the 
organizations have access to only one type of the contributions that can be raised by 
persuading private decision makers. Focusing exclusively on obtaining 1% designations 
seems to be especially frequent.
Figure 2
Composition of nonprot organizations by their access to 1% designations,
individual and corporate donations in Hungary in 2005
Source: (KSH 2007)
is organizational behaviour is all the more surprising because the research results 
clearly indicate that there is a positive and close link between taxpayers’ exercise of the 1% 
designation option and their willingness to make individual donations.
The Consistency of Individual Donors’ Behaviour
As displayed in Figure 3, those taxpayers exercising the 1% designation option are in all 
respects better donors than those who – even though they pay taxes – do not ll out their 
designation declaration.3
3 The average share of donors within the adult population is 65 percent. Both groups of taxpayers are much better 
donors than those who do not pay tax (Czike & Kuti, 2006).
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Figure 3
Percentage of donors among designating and non-designating taxpayers
in Hungary in 2004
Source: Data base of the individual giving and volunteering survey.
Financial donations can take various forms. eir oldest and still very widespread form 
is the gis given to beggars and the money dropped into a collection box set up at public 
places such as churches, post oces and airports. Donation lines operated largely by media 
support and collections using premium rate text messages are also gaining in popularity. 
Donations given through buying products and services (e.g. the participation in charity 
events, purchases of UNICEF postcards, artefacts, souvenirs, stamps or newspapers 
produced and/or sold by people in need) are quite frequent, as well. As a matter of fact, 
the cash donations made to secular nonprot organizations we focus on in this paper are 
much less common than these other kinds of gis. Only 12 percent of the adult population 
are involved in this kind of giving. eir cash donations to secular nonprot organizations 
account for 29 percent of the total amount of the money given in dierent ways.
Figure 3 reects that the behaviour of taxpayers is fairly consistent. ere is a 
considerable amount of overlap between the pool of designating taxpayers and those giving 
from their own pockets, thus the fear of a crowding out eect seems to be ill-founded. If 
something is wrong, this is denitely not related to the 1% designators’ willingness to respond 
to other kinds of solicitations. It has much more to do with the fund raising behaviour of the 
voluntary organizations. What was already indicated by the regular statistical data (Figure 
2), is conrmed by the survey results (Figure 4): both the 1% system and potential private 
donations represent vast but hitherto untapped sources of nonprot sector revenues. 
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Figure 4
e composition of taxpayers by their behaviour in relation to 1% designations and 
cash donations to secular nonprot organizations in Hungary in 2004
Source: Data base of the individual giving and volunteering survey. 
More than half of the taxpayers have remained virtually untouched by the 1% appeals 
for the last ten years. It is rather shocking that voluntary organizations have either failed 
to reach them or have not managed to persuade them to carry out the 5 minute task of 
preparing their 1% declaration. Another 40 percent of the taxpayers have supported secular 
nonprot organizations in a single way, and only 11 percent through both the channels of 1% 
contributions and cash donations. is suggests that the eorts of nonprot organizations to 
attract private donations and their campaigns appealing for 1% support are far from ecient. 
ough they may reinforce each other to help extend the circle of donors, these campaigns 
are rarely co-ordinated. e fund raisers do not seem to consider that both success and 
failure may have common roots when the target population of the two kinds of solicitations 
is the same or at least overlapping. It is likely that taxpayers make or do not make nancial 
donations for the same reasons they decide to designate or not to designate the recipient 
of their 1% support. When they form their attitudes toward nonprot organizations, they 
probably do not separate the impressions gained from dierent fund raising appeals, 1% 
designation campaigns, or other NPO-related news and press coverage. 
Meaningfully enough, the social and demographic characteristics of the donors and 
1% designators are very similar. Women – who are generally better donors than men – are 
also more reliable when it comes to 1% designations. e inuence of age is even more 
marked. e proportion of donors and those lling out 1% declarations is higher among 
taxpayers aged between 40 and 60 than either in younger or older age groups. Data on 
marital status reveal the relative passivity of unmarried people. Voluntary organizations 
seeking 1% designations and individual donations have the best chance of attracting support 
from people who are married and have one or two children.
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Educational achievement is a very important determinant of all kinds of charitable 
behaviour. is is also conrmed by data related to 1% designations. e proportion of 
designating taxpayers  increases in proportion with the level of education, and the rate 
is extremely high among those who have college or university degrees. An analysis of 
occupational status also naturally shows a much higher contribution rate among white 
collar employees than the average.
Relationships and networks also play a crucial role in forming the giving and 1% 
decisions. e closer and more extensive the social aliations of the individuals, the more 
probable their contribution to the promotion of public benet. It is likely that the explanatory 
power of some of the demographic features and social status indicators listed above also 
results from their importance in shaping the ties between the individuals and society. (For 
example, marital status and age aect the depth and breadth of people’s relationships. e 
presence of children in the family brings people into contact with schools and kindergartens 
whose foundations are seeking grants and 1% contributions.)
Closer ties beyond the informal sphere – membership of voluntary organizations 
(associations, clubs), trade unions, professional bodies and political parties – have a 
strong eect on behaviour. e proportion of donors and 1% designators is higher among 
members than among non-members, probably because they are more committed and 
better informed. e same conclusion is reached if the relationships between contribution 
decisions and voluntary activities are examined. e proportion of donations and completed 
1% declarations from people who do voluntary work is much higher than average. It is likely 
that voluntary work within the third sector aects giving behaviour through the closer 
relationships involved. Volunteers become familiar with the problems of the organization 
they work for, they participate in its success, identify with its objectives, and thus it becomes 
natural for them to also make nancial contributions.
In all probability, the same holds true for those individuals who are in a position to 
inuence the corporate strategy of philanthropy.
Corporate Giving and Corporate Decision Makers as Private  onors
One of the most important ndings of the survey of corporate giving (Kuti 2005) is the 
one concerning the structure of decision making. It has turned out that the owners play 
an outstanding role in the selection of the nonprot organizations supported by their 
companies. Giving decisions are made solely by the owner(s) in 80 percent of the donor 
rms. Another 17 percent of them delegate this task to the top managers. e share of 
companies where the decision is made in other ways (e.g. by a corporate foundation) is only 
3 percent. is obviously means that the personal attitudes of the owners and top managers 
are extremely important. One can also expect that there would be some connection between 
these corporate leaders’ private and ‘business-related’ charitable behaviour. Unfortunately, 
questions on individual giving by the corporate decision makers were not included in 
the interviews of the corporate giving survey. However, other interviews with private 
entrepreneurs (Laki & Szalai 2004; T. Puskás 2006) have proved the existence of such a 
connection. 
In addition to this anecdotal evidence, we can also rely on the empirical information 
produced by the individual giving and volunteering survey. Since its sample was quite big, 
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the subsamples of potential top managers (479 individuals with a university or college 
degree)4 and private entrepreneurs (350 respondents) are still large enough to be analyzed 
separately. e results of this analysis (Figure 5) reveal that both groups with the chance 
to inuence corporate giving are signicantly better donors than any other segment of the 
adult population. We nd an especially big dierence if we compare the willingness to 
support nonprot organizations.  
Figure 5
e share of individual donors and supporters of secular nonprot organizations 
within the group of private entrepreneurs and potential corporate managers
 in Hungary in 2004
Source: Data base of the individual giving and volunteering survey. 
ese ndings perfectly correspond with the results of the 2003 survey of corporate giving, 
according to which nearly two thirds of the Hungarian companies5 donate to voluntary 
organizations and only 16 percent of them say that they do not and denitely would not 
support the nonprot sector (Kuti 2005). e rest of the companies indicate that they do 
not make donations but they might do so in some form in the future. 
4 Admittedly, only a section (about one quarter) of those with a university or college degree have a chance to become 
top managers, thus the two groups can hardly be treated as identical. If we still dare to venture this rough estimation 
(the best possible approximation we can produce on the basis of the empirical data available from the 2004 giving and 
volunteering survey), this is because the somewhat more detailed 1993 survey (Czakó et al., 1995) proved that there 
was practically no difference between the top managers and other individuals with a higher education degree in this 
respect. In the two groups the share of donors were 59.1 and 60.0 percent; the share of supporters of the secular NPOs 
were 21.9 and 22.4 percent, respectively.
5 The companies studied were all ‘independent legal entities’, i.e. joint stock companies, limited liability companies, 
cooperatives, etc. The word ‘companies’ as used in this paper always refers to such entities.
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A much higher proportion of companies operating in villages than those in large 
towns give support to nonprot organizations. Living together with the local community 
tends to engender a kind of local identity and sense of responsibility. Relationships are 
stronger, NPOs and their leaders are probably better known and the use of donations is 
easier to check than in large cities. Managers of local companies oen have personal or 
family connections to school foundations and recreational and cultural associations. It is 
almost inevitable that they become involved in community foundations, associations for 
rural tourism, neighborhood watch associations and other civil initiatives. Commercial 
interest is oen attached to support for the local development organizations. Essentially 
the opposite is true in large cities, where economic and social roles tend to be separated, 
relationships are looser and funding activity is, therefore, much less personally-based.
ough local embeddedness is clearly an important factor of corporate donations, it 
is also true that corporate giving is not limited to local voluntary organizations. Over half 
of the donor companies (including those operating in small towns and villages) also make 
donations to unknown organizations enquiring from outside their hometown or village. 
Many of the fund raisers contact the companies without any previous acquaintance – by 
letter, personally, or by telephone. It is rather puzzling that such impersonal methods have 
become accepted and successful so quickly among business people who are normally better 
known for their caution and who are supposed to think of donation policy in terms of their 
company’s interests.
It seems that the owners, executives and managers of companies behave as ‘private 
individuals’ when deciding on corporate donations. Interviews with the members of 
the newly emerging Hungarian elite of entrepreneurs (Laki & Szalai 2004) also show 
that the requests for personal and corporate donations are treated very similarly. ese 
entrepreneurs do not see much dierence between their own social responsibility and 
that of their companies. ey feel they are obliged to directly address social problems. 
eir individual and corporate nancial contributions to the actions taken by nonprot 
organizations mainly follow the patterns of traditional charity. e impact of corporate 
interests and other business-related considerations is rather weak, though recognizable, in 
the composition of donations by elds of activity of the recipient voluntary organizations. 
The Structure of 1% Designations, Individual and Corporate Donations
If we take a closer look at the composition of the three dierent kinds of contributions, 
(Figure 6), we can discover both similarities and dierences. First of all, a large part of 
all three (about two thirds of the 1% designations, 60 percent of the individual donations 
and half of the corporate donations) are received by nonprot organizations working in 
the traditional elds of welfare services, namely social care, health care and education. 
Education is a top priority for private individuals in both their roles of 1% designators and 
donors, while it has to share the top position with social care on the priority list of corporate 
donors. 
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Figure 6
Composition of 1% contributions, individual and corporate donations by elds of 
activity of the recipient nonprot organizations in Hungary in 2005
Source: (KSH 2007).
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Nonprot organizations engaged in social care constitute the second most important target 
group of individual donations and 1% support. Health care is the third priority of all three 
types of donors. Culture, sports, advocacy, and public safety seem to be more important 
for corporate donors than for private individuals. About the same share of individual 
and corporate donations go to nonprot organizations specialized in local and economic 
development while taxpayers transfer only a negligible number of their 1% designations to 
this eld. Church-related foundations and voluntary associations attract some individual 
donations and 1% support but they are not supported by companies.
All in all, the main priorities are rather similar but there are also some important 
dierences. e distribution of corporate donations among the elds of activities is less 
concentrated than that of the support distributed by private individuals. is more even 
distribution probably reects more varied considerations, dierent interests, and perhaps a 
richer, more sophisticated interpretation of social responsibility. It is worth trying, then, to 
gain an insight into the motivation background of the dierent donors’ decisions.
An Attempt to Compare Donors’ and 1% Designators’ Motivations
All of the three surveys which are analyzed in this paper included a series of questions on 
the donors’ and designating taxpayers’ intentions and motives, but these questions were far 
from standardized. As a consequence, the comparability of the answers is very limited. If 
we still want to compare the technically incomparable, we have to create a small number 
of new variables which aggregate the answers to questions which catch several dimensions 
of the same kind of motivation. As an outcome of such a grouping, I have developed three 
variables describing three dierent types of motives, namely those of 
charity, social responsibility,¾
relationship, participation, ¾
private interest and benet.¾
e ‘charity, social responsibility’ category consists of answers such as ‘Helping makes 
me feel good’; ‘I wanted to help the needy’; ‘It is a moral obligation to help’; ‘Solidarity and 
sympathy was the motive of the donation’; ‘We gave for emotional reasons’; ‘We wanted to 
contribute to the solution of a social problem’; etc.
Answers are classied as belonging to the ‘relationship, participation’ category if they 
refer to some connection with the beneciary organizations. For example: ‘I am / my family 
members are / our employees are members of the voluntary association’; ‘Social, emotional, 
and/or business relations with the beneciary organization or with its leaders’; ‘Former 
connections with the organization, gratefulness or nostalgia’; etc.
e ‘private interest and benet’ category includes answers such as ‘I am / my family 
members are / our employees are clients of the beneciary organization’; ‘e services 
provided by the organization improve our neighborhood or environment’; ‘e support of 
a prestigious voluntary organization improves the image of the company’; etc.  
e respondents of the surveys were naturally allowed to mention several motives 
since it is highly possible that the very same donor is guided by dierent emotions or 
considerations when answering to dierent solicitations. us the sum of the percentages 
in Figure 7 exceeds 100 percent.
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Figure 7
e percentage of 1% designators, individual and corporate donors 
mentioning dierent reasons for donating in Hungary
Sources: Data bases of the individual giving and volunteering survey, the corporate giving survey,  and the survey of 1% 
designations.
e most important motives for donating are obviously willingness to help, solidarity toward 
the needy, and responsibility for the general well-being of the community. Private interests 
are the least frequently mentioned considerations, while the importance of relationships 
with beneciaries is somewhere in between. However, the picture is not as simple as this 
general statement would suggest. ere seem to be some rather unexpected dierences 
between the motivations of the 1% designators, individual and corporate donors.
First of all, the charitable motivation is equally dominant among individual and 
corporate donors but signicantly less important when taxpayers decide on the beneciary 
of their 1% contributions. On the other hand, personal interests have a much stronger 
inuence on taxpayers’ and even private donors’ behaviour than companies’ interests are 
reported to have on corporate giving. Finally, close relationships (membership, voluntary 
work) are much more powerful factors of individual donors’ behaviour than that of 
corporate decision makers and 1% designators.
e relatively low share of charity-guided and the relatively high share of interest-
guided 1% designations are explained by a certain duality of the successful solicitation 
techniques. e bulk of the 1% support is raised in two specic ways by two dierent kinds 
of nonprot organizations. 
As we have already seen in Figure 6, the eld of education is the number one beneciary 
of the 1% designations. e recipient organizations of this support are almost exclusively 
foundations which raise funds for kindergartens, schools and universities. e parents of 
schoolchildren and students feel more or less obliged to help the institutions which provide 
their children with services, especially because the 1% requests are generally delivered by 
the children themselves. Similarly, the foundations of hospitals, some social care providers, 
and some nonprot organizations specialized in rehabilitation and recreation services have 
direct access to their clients and the relatives of these clients, thus they can attract 1% support 
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without making too much eort or spending too much money. In these cases, taxpayers’ 
decisions are based on their direct interest in improving the quality and/or increasing the 
quantity of services used by them or by their relatives.
On the other extreme, high amounts of 1% support can be mobilized by nonprot 
organizations involved in causes (aid for ill and starving children, the ght against cancer, 
animal welfare) that are ‘easy to sell’ to a wide circle of taxpayers through completely 
impersonal publicity and media campaigns. e large number of these cases explains why 
the importance of relationships with the beneciaries is reported to be relatively low by the 
1% designators.
By contrast, almost half of the individual donors mentioned that close relationships 
with the supported voluntary organizations and participation in their work motivated the 
selection of beneciaries. ese ndings are in line with numerous other research results 
from various countries, all conrming that philanthropy “is a matter not just of moral 
capital in the form of generosity. It is perhaps more a matter of associational capital in the 
form of social networks of invitation and obligation.” (Schervish and Havens 1997:257).
Nevertheless, charity, sympathy and solidarity play an outstanding role in giving 
decisions. is is not surprising at all in the case of individual donors, but it is against all 
expectations (Harsányi & Révész 2005) in the case of corporate donors. More than nine 
tenths of the latter mentioned charitable motivations and only 15 percent admitted that 
companies’ interests had some inuence on their giving decisions. ese statements are 
in marked contrast to the general belief that companies’ priorities regarding donations 
are determined by their business interests. Even if the respondents exaggerate6 somewhat 
when they emphasize the charitable nature and underrate the interest background of their 
donations, it is still undeniable that the current Hungarian approach to corporate social 
responsibility is dominated by the ethical/altruistic model (Burlingame 2001) of corporate 
behaviour.7
From a practical point of view, these ndings of the three surveys summarized above 
can be extremely useful for voluntary organizations seeking private support. ey obviously 
have to know the behaviour and understand the motivations of potential donors and 1% 
designators in order to select the appropriate fund raising techniques (Csizmár & Nemoda 
2001) and to nd the right words and the right tone in composing their appeals.
Lessons to be learnt by fund raisers
e very fact that only about half of the taxpayers exercise their 1% designation option and 
12 percent of the adult population help the nonprot organizations with cash donations 
(while a much higher share of the very same people donate in some other ways) indicates 
that only the easiest and most obvious steps have been made in order to gain their support. 
6 Specifically targeted, in-depth-interview research would be necessary in order to reveal whether corporate interests are 
really so little involved in giving decisions, or whether some kind of ‘decent reticence’ prevents entrepreneurs and top 
managers from admitting the economic considerations behind charitable acts.
7 Burlingame (2001, pp 93-94) identifies four different models of corporate engagement in social affairs, namely the 
neoclassical/corporate productivity model, the political model, the ethical/altruistic model, and the stakeholder 
model.
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e same conclusion can be drawn form the very low share of nonprot organizations 
having equal access to 1% designations, individual and corporate donations (Figure 2).
is also means that there is a vast, unexplored ‘market’ for nonprot organizations 
which are ready and able to identify their potential supporters and to use more innovative 
and more sophisticated solicitation methods. Clearly, real improvements in the 
dissemination of information to reach taxpayers, other private individuals and corporate 
leaders so far untouched by NPO campaigns can only be made through the use of more 
exible methods, more individually targeted and dierentiated messages, and perhaps a 
more sincere intention on the part of nonprot organizations to co-operate with potential 
donors and not just attract their contributions. Much more conscious, well thought out 
eorts and increased professionalism are absolutely necessary for success. is professional 
improvement should mean not only the use of more ecient solicitation techniques but 
also the task of building solid relationships between citizens and voluntary organizations. 
e need for a partnership approach is also revealed by another nding of the above 
analysis. e fact that traditional charity apparently dominates the donors’ behaviour 
(Figures 6 and 7) may have particular implications. Progress in other elds (such as human 
rights, community development, environment, etc.), probably demands more than the 
perfection of fund raising techniques; there is a need for a change of attitude, as well. A 
sustained increase in support for civil society issues is only likely if donors acknowledge 
the importance of this dimension of socio-economic development and recognize its 
implications for their own interests and responsibilities. e best way of engendering and 
fostering this new attitude would be to replace occasional cash-seeking campaigns with a 
conscious, professional fund raising strategy based on collaboration with those involved 
and to build up sustained contacts between donors and civil society organizations based 
on mutual esteem.
e surveys of individual and corporate donations also indicate that, paradoxically 
enough, there is a gap between the general opinion on nonprot organizations and the 
actual reactions to their funding requests. As revealed by our interviews, there is widespread 
complaint, confusion and distrust regarding the nonprot organizations themselves, their 
fund raising methods and uncivilized conduct. It is especially important to note that donors 
do not seem to have a much better opinion of voluntary organizations and their fund raising 
campaigns than non-donors. ey are not satised with either the expressions of thanks or 
the feedback they get from the supported organizations. e deciencies of the culture of 
asking for gis and giving thanks may result in the loss of numerous former donors and a 
considerable amount of donations.
e critical comments of our interviewees are a warning that fund raising in Hungary 
has probably reached a turning point. e potential for extensive growth is likely to run out 
in a very short time, thus there is a need for radical qualitative changes. Even the increasingly 
professional fund raising campaigns can only be successful if
the trustworthiness and credibility of those requesting support can be ¾
guaranteed,
ethical norms for fund raising are established, and¾
regulatory, organizational and infrastructural resources to enforce them are ¾
available.
It is essential to make these steps if the nonprot sector wants to rely on donors’ 
support in future.
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To sum up, success in increasing donations calls for more than an improvement in 
fund raising strategies and techniques. It must be borne in mind that initial trust can easily 
be squandered. Nonprot organizations should make serious eorts to make things clear 
and help donors to orient themselves in the voluntary sector. It is also important to stabilize 
contacts with donors and 1% designators and urge them to help voluntary organizations in 
several dierent ways. 
Conclusions
ough the empirical basis of the analysis presented in this paper is limited to Hungary, the 
results are likely to be also relevant in other countries. One of the most striking research 
results is that numerous third sector organizations have a rather monolithic income 
structure. ey are dependent on just one or very few kinds of donations. Many of them 
do not even try to prot from the fact that the very same supporter may be in a position to 
help them in several ways. If they attached more importance to the connections between 
the dierent kinds of donations, they could probably develop much more ecient fund 
raising strategies. 
e research results also suggest that it is crucial to understand the motivations 
behind nancing decisions. Rich as it is, the literature on fund raising techniques can only 
be useful if the third sector organizations are prepared to explore the characteristics of their 
actual revenue structure and to analyze whether it matches their organizational character, 
the nature of their services and activities. While correctly identifying the possible funders 
is a necessary precondition, the success of fund raising eorts mainly depends on the 
knowledge of the needs, interests, values, and considerations of potential supporters. 
Nonprot organizations supported through dierent mechanisms have to cooperate 
with dierent partners and the rules of cooperation are also dierent. Whether individual 
or corporate donations constitute the basis of nancing, the donors’ preferences, values, 
attitudes, and emotions must be discovered by the grant seekers. When they try to build 
strong, emotionally bonded relationships with their major donors, they must have in 
mind that even the same individuals can behave in dierent ways depending on their 
current position. Designating the recipient of a sum of public money, deciding on the 
recipients of corporate donations or giving from their own pocket may involve dierent 
kinds of considerations and dierent decision making mechanisms. However, the personal 
motivations are hardly negligible and the experiences gathered in one of these roles may 
inuence the other kinds of philanthropic decisions, as well.
Both the theory of rational choice and the decisions led by norms or the feeling of 
responsibility should be studied if voluntary organizations want to raise dierent kinds of 
donations. 
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